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Abstract—Laser fault injection through the front side (and
consequently the metal-fills) of an IC is often performed with
medium or small laser beams for the purpose of injecting
bytewise faults. We have investigated in this paper the properties
of fault injection with a larger laser beam (in the 100µm range).
We have also checked whether the bit-set (or bit-reset) fault type
still holds or whether the bit-flip fault type may be encountered.
Laser injection experiments were performed during the last
round of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm
running on an ASIC. The gathered data allowed to investigate the
obtained fault models, to conduct two usual Differencial Fault
Attack (DFA) schemes and to propose a simple version of a third
DFA.
Index Terms—DFA, laser fault injection, fault model, AES
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure circuits are prone to a wide range of physical
attacks. Among them, fault attacks (FA) are based on the
disturbance of the chip environmental conditions in order to
induce faults into its computations. Fault injection may be
achieved by using laser exposure [1] [2], voltage [3] or clock
glitches [4], electromagnetic perturbation, etc. It exists a very
efficient method called Differential Fault Attack (DFA) applied
to encryption algorithms that takes advantage of a comparison
between correct and faulted ciphertexts to retrieve the secret
key used during the ciphering process. These different attack
schemes involve strong constraints on the faults location,
range, and injection-time. Nevertheless laser injection is often
considered as one of the best means to inject faults in order to
perform a DFA. Indeed, a laser source allows a precise control
on repeatability, timings of injection (the shot instant and pulse
duration) and focalization. It appears as a suitable tool to meet
the constraints of the various DFA schemes. However, since the
technology of Integrated Circuits (IC) is continuously evolving
(more transistors are inside the effect area of a given laser
beam, and more metal-fills are reflecting it) this statement has
to be checked.
In this paper, we studied the effect of a large laser spot
to inject faults into the calculations of our target: an ASIC
implementing the AES [5] algorithm. We also analysed the
effects of front side injection on the properties of the injected
faults (fault type, repeatability, fault range, etc.) The obtained
data were used to perform two usual DFA [6][7]. Then, we
simplified an existing DFA [8] that allowed us to perform the
analysis with less complexity. This approach took advantage
of the experimental settings (i.e. the use of a large laser spot
through the front side and its metal-fills).
The paper is organized as follows. The first part is a
reminder of the different effects of laser on silicon: it em-
phasizes on the notion of laser-sensitive areas, and also gives
a description of the fault injection process. The laser set-
up and the device used for the test are described in the
second part followed by the display of the experimental results
and their analysis about the observed fault model and its
justification. The third part reports the use of two usual DFA
on the experimental results and the simplification of a third
DFA to enhance the efficiency. Finally, all these results are
summarized in the conclusion with some perspectives.
II. FAULT INJECTION WITH A LASER SOURCE
Laser shots on ICs were firstly used to simulate radiation-
induced faults [9]. More recently the use of a laser to inject
faults into the computations of a secure device was introduced
by S. Skorobogatov and R. Anderson [1]. In the following
we first remind the main properties of the photoelectric effect
created by a laser passing through silicon before describing
the resulting fault injection process.
A. Laser effects on ICs and consequences
The photoelectric effect is generated by a laser beam passing
through silicon provided that its photons energy is greater than
the silicon bandgap [9]. This effect creates electron-hole pairs
along the laser path. Generally these pairs recombine and there
is no noticeable effect on the IC’s behaviour. However, under
specific conditions, some undesired effects may appear: the
so-called Single Event Effects (SEE).
A SEE happens when the charge carriers (i.e. electrons
and holes) created by the laser beam are drifted in opposite
directions by the electrical field found in the PN-junctions of
CMOS transistors instead of recombining. As a consequence
a transient current (i.e. moving charge carriers) is generated
through the struck junction. This phenomenon is depicted
in the left part of Fig. 1, where the PN-junction of an
NMOS transistor in its “turned OFF” state is drawn. After
the creation of the electron-hole pairs along the laser beam,
two phenomena lead to the creation of the transient current:
the prompt charge collection, or funnelling, and the diffusion.
The first phenomenon stretches the depletion region (hence the
extension of the electric field) along the laser beam, within
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a few picoseconds the charges nearby are collected giving a
current peak. Then, in a second time, the remaining charges
are collected in a longer diffusing scheme: the diffusion. The
right part of Fig. 1 shows the transient current associated with
these two phenomena as given in [10].
Fig. 1. Photoelectric effect of a laser beam through a PN-junction (left)
- Transient current resulting from charge collection after a laser shot [10]
(rigth).
It exists a strong electric field, sufficient to create a transient
current as explained above, in any PN-junction of the transis-
tors used in CMOS logic regardless of their state (i.e. turned
“ON” or “OFF”). However, such a transient current may, or
may not, have an effect on the target’s logic signals depending
on both its location and the data handled by the logic. These
dependencies are usually explained by considering the inverter
case (see figure 2).
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Fig. 2. Inverter’s schematic with its data-dependent sensitive areas.
Consider the left part of Fig. 2 where the inverter’s input
is at a low logical level: its PMOS transistor is turned “ON”
and its NMOS transistor is turned “OFF”. Hence the inverter’s
output is at a high logical level and its output’s capacitive load
(dotted in Fig. 2) is charged. The inverter has four PN-junctions
which are likely to give rise to a transient current if struck
by a laser: the drains and sources of both PMOS and NMOS
transistors. Nevertheless only a transient current originated in
the NMOS’ drain will result in a disturbance of the inverter’s
output (pointed out by a filled grey ellipse). In that case, the
transient current is flowing from the drain to the substrate
which is grounded (as drawn in the top part of Fig. 1). Hence
the capacitive load is discharged provided that the transient
current is big enough to overcome a charging current flowing
through the “ON” PMOS transistor. As a result the output of
the inverter passes temporarily to a low logical level. When the
transient current vanishes, the capacitive load is charged again
via the turned “ON” PMOS transistor. Thus, due to the transient
current generated in the NMOS’ drain, the output voltage of the
inverter undergoes a transient voltage inversion. This transient
voltage may then propagate through the downstream logic: a
so-called Single Event Transient (SET). Any transient current
created in the NMOS’ source has no effect on the output
since it is isolated from the output by the turned “OFF”
NMOS. Regarding the transient currents created in the PMOS’
diffusions, they create a leakage path to the N-well which is
biased at the core supply voltage (i.e. Vdd). Hence they have
no discharging effect on the output’s capacitive load. To sum
up, the only laser, or SEE, sensitive area of an inverter, when
its input is in a low logical state, is the drain of the “OFF”
NMOS transistor.
Likewise, when considering an inverter with its input at
high level (right part of Fig. 2), a similar reasoning may be
conducted. It results that the only laser, or SEE, sensitive area
of an inverter when its input is in a high logical state is the
drain of the “OFF” PMOS (underlined in grey).
As a conclusion, the laser sensitive area of a CMOS inverter
is the drain of the “OFF” transistor, whose location is changing
with the logical level of the inverter’s input. In a more general
way the laser sensitive areas of CMOS ICs are data-dependent.
The occurrence of a laser-induced fault depends on the handled
data.
B. Laser fault injection mechanism
As reminded in the previous section the laser illumination of
an IC’s sensitive area results in the propagation of a transient
voltage in its logic. This SET may turn into a computational
fault according two mechanisms.
The first mechanism is illustrated in figure 3. The SET
becomes a fault as it is latched into a register (or D flip-flop,
DFF) in place of the correct data. If it reaches the DFF’s input
outside its latching window (around the rising edge of the
clock) the SET vanishes without any effect on DFF’s output
value and then on the target’s calculations (denoted 1st case
in Fig. 3). On the contrary if it reaches the DFF’s input during
the latching window, it is latched: a fault is actually injected
(denoted 2nd case in Fig. 3) and change the DFF’s output value.
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Fig. 3. Fault injection mechanism due to a SET.
The second mechanism happens when the SET is generated
inside a DFF or an SRAM. These memory elements are indeed
made of cross-coupled inverters. As a consequence the SET
will propagate from the struck inverter’s output to its own input
by passing through the cross-coupled inverter. As a result,
the memorised data is inverted: a fault is injected. This fault
injection mechanism is called a Single Event Upset (SEU).
Fault injection according these two mechanisms is also
time-dependent. This statement is obvious regarding the prop-
agation of an SET as exemplified in Fig. 3. A similar behaviour
takes place for SEUs. The resulting false data, which is
stored in a DFF, has to propagate and to induce at least one
miscalculation in the logic. Then, it has to be latched into the
subsequent registers bank to be turned into an actual fault. This
process has timing requirements: if the SEU arises before and
to close to the clock rising edge it will be soon overwritten by
a correct data. Thus it may not have the time to reach the next
register bank before the clock rising edge. Consequently the
false data may propagate through the downstream logic nearly
followed by a correct data: it may be overwritten before being
latched at the next clock rising edge.
C. Discussion on the laser fault model
The properties of laser-induced faults reviewed in subsec-
tions II-A and II-B were established under the assumption
that the effect range of the considered laser spots was cir-
cumscribed to one sensitive area. Under this assumption the
fault injection process is data-dependent. More precisely the
sensitive areas are changing with the data. For a given laser
setting (location of the laser spot, energy level, timing of the
injection), the fault may occur or not depending of the data
processed by the target. This behaviour may be described as
a bit-set or a bit-reset fault type [11]. A data bit suffers from
a bit-set (resp. a bit-reset) fault, if it is changed from 0 to
1 (resp. from 1 to 0), thus creating a calculation error. On
the contrary, it remains unfaulted if its logical value was yet
a 1 (resp. a 0). This fault type is very worrying as it makes
it possible to mount safe error attacks against cryptosystems
[12].
The ability to obtain a bit-set or bit-reset fault in former
technologies is well established [13]. However, this ability
is questionable in advanced CMOS processes. The first
reason is that the minimal diameter of a laser spot could
not be successfully decreased to smaller than 1µm due to
optical constraints. Hence, in advanced technologies the laser
spot could encompass several transistors violating our first
assumption and induce a bit flip fault type (which refer to an
inversion of the faulted bit regardless of its value) or impact
several bits. Moreover as technologies are evolving the metal
density over ICs increases due to metal-fill requirements
[14]. Metal lines or fills are reflecting laser beams making
it more and more difficult to access to sensitive areas from
the front side. The main consequence is that most of laser
fault injection are carried out through the rear side with a
small spot size. This method is not easy, time consuming
and a proper preparation of the chip (i.e. de-packaging) is
needed. In the other side, laser fault injection, in front side
with a large spot, is easier to perform but seems to be not
consistent with bit-set or bit-reset fault injection. This is one
point we have considered to explore in this work: the effect
of a large laser spot (∼ 125µm ∗ 125µm) through the metal
coverage on the fault properties. The bit-flip fault type was
also considered in this work.
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
A. The Laser test bench
The fault injection experiments reported in this paper were
performed front side with a green laser source of 532nm
wavelength. The laser pulses it produces, have a constant
duration of 5ns. Optical settings were chosen to obtain a
square laser spot of 125µm∗125µm. The energy was tuned to
750nJ per shot. Hence, given the transmission coefficient of the
optics, an energy density of 17pJ/µm2 was achieved under the
laser beam. For the sake of simplicity a trigger signal issued
from the test chip was used to synchronize the laser shots with
the AES encryptions. It made it possible to target the beginning
of the AES last round with a jitter of +
−
5ns.
Fig. 4. The AES-128 target device with its 36 shooting sectors
B. The target device
The target device is an ASIC implementing the AES al-
gorithm [5] in its 128-bits key length version (AES-128).
The AES-128 is a substitution and permutation algorithm. It
consists of 10 identical rounds after a short initial round;
each round is a succession of four different transformation.
In our implementation, one round needs only one clock cycle
to be achieved. The entire encryption is performed in 11
clock cycles. The ASIC was operated at 25 MHz during our
experiments (although its maximum allowable frequency is
50 MHz). A picture of the silicon chip is given in figure 4. It
was designed in a 6-metal layers, 0.13 µm technology. None
of the circuit’s functional blocks is identifiable at sight: the
whole design was scrambled (glue logic). Fig. 4 also shows
the partitioning of the target’s surface into 36 shooting sectors
corresponding of the laser spot’s size. Laser fault injections
were done according this partitioning.
C. Experimental results
In the following, the obtained faults are classified and
analysed at byte level because they were induced during the
AES’ last round, corresponding cryptanalyses of which are
considered byte-wise (see section IV).
A large fault injection experiment was conducted. For every
shooting sector of Fig. 4, 10,000 encryptions were ran with
random plaintexts but the same key. During these experiments
no latch-up or reset of the component have been reported.
Simultaneously the laser was fired and the output ciphertext
(faulted or not) was retrieved. It was then analysed to establish
whether it was erroneous or not. In case of an error the injected
fault was recovered by reversing the encryption of the faulted
ciphertext and also by comparison with a correct encryption
(the key and the plaintexts were known). Despite the large
spot size (125µm ∗ 125µm), most of the induced faults were
single-bit faults. Table I reports a synthesis of these results. For
every byte of the AES state the faults of the shooting sector,
corresponding to the highest error rate, are reported. The rates
of the single-bit and most common faults are also given (e.g.
consider byte0: 480 encryptions were faulted, amongst them
79% were single-bit faults and the most encountered fault
appeared with a 74% rate).
TABLE I
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
byte # Error injection Single-bit error Most common fault
rate rate rate
0 4.8% 79% 74%
1 3.2% 100% 99%
2 3.1% 98% 92%
3 67.8% 49% 48%
4 9.4% 99.7% 90%
5 2.1% 79% 58%
6 0.5% 100% 99%
7 4.6% 65% 64%
8 23% 64% 42%
9 7.2% 91% 80%
10 4.3% 99% 98%
11 15.,5% 97% 97%
12 12.2% 98% 96%
13 3.1% 87% 55%
14 0.2% 100% 100%
15 7% 99.2% 99%
A second set of experiments was conducted for a location
of the laser beam that gave rise to a relatively high error
occurrence rate on byte number 5. 1,000 encryptions with the
same previous constant key and random plaintexts were done
simultaneously with laser injection. Its results are reported in
table II.
TABLE II
LASER INJECTION ON BYTE NUMBER 5 (RANDOM PLAINTEXTS)
Faults occurrence Occurrence rate Occurrence rate
rate of fault ’0x80’ of other faults
7.1% 94% 6%
One of the previous plaintexts related to an actual injection
of fault was then selected to conduct another set of 1,000
encryptions (i.e. the whole experimental settings were the
same for each attempt). Table III displays its statistics.
TABLE III
STATISTICS OF FAULT INJECTION ON A CONSTANT PLAINTEXT
Faults occurrence Occurrence rate Occurrence rate
rate of fault ’0x80’ of other faults
16.8% 97% 3%
D. Analysis of the laser-induced faults
The fault occurrence rate reported in table III (for one
given plaintext) is approximately twice the rate reported in
table II (for several random plaintexts). The explanation lies
in the data-dependent nature of laser-induced faults. A deeper
analysis of the single-bit fault (i.e. 0x80) injected during these
experiments revealed that the faulted bit was always a 0 turned
into a 1. Moreover,among the 1,000 encryptions of table II no
fault was injected when the original value of the faulted bit (i.e.
the correct, or none faulted, bit value) was a 1. These results
reveal a bit-set fault type. Moreover the faults occurrence rate
grows from 7.1% to 14.2% when only the fault injection
attempts consistent with a bit-set are considered.
However, a 16% faults occurrence rate is still low as laser
fault injection is often considered as deterministic. The jitter of
the laser setup is probably an (incomplete) explanation given
the time-dependent nature of the fault injection mechanism
(see subsection II-B). The fact that several laser-sensitive areas
are under the laser spot is another hypothesis that would be
worth studying.
Among the large amount of data we have processed, we also
report here a further analysis of the result obtained on byte #3
during the first experiment. They are extensively reported in
table IV. At bit-level, the fault occurrence rates of bits b2
and b1 were respectively 34.3% and 66%. A deeper analysis
revealed that the fault types of bits b2 and b1 were respectively
a bit-set and a bit-flip.
TABLE IV
FAULTS INJECTED ON BYTE NUMBER 3
Fault value # of occurrence
b7...b4 b3b2b1b0
0000 0110 3285
0000 0010 3228
0000 1110 93
0000 1000 70
0000 0100 51
0000 0001 40
0000 1001 13
0000 0011 4
These experiments showed that the bit-set (or bit-reset) and
bit-flip fault types are both attainable for laser fault injection
with a large spot from the front side of the target. Our
explanation is that the metal-fills act as shutters that allow to
stimulate only a few laser-sensitive areas. In some cases it is
consistent with the bit-set or bit-reset fault type. For others two
sensitive areas related to a common data bit are simultaneously
stimulated: one by a bit-set fault type, the second by a bit-
reset. As a result a bit-flip fault type is achieved. An intended
application of this phenomenon is reported in [14].
IV. DFA OF THE AES LAST ROUND
Two schemes of DFA are based on an analysis of the AES
last round in the presence of faults [6], [7]: they make it
possible to retrieve its last round key. In this section we
study the relevance of using these techniques to process our
experimental data, especially with the data where the single-bit
fault occurrence rate or repeatability are low. We also report
and discuss the use of a DFA scheme on the AES last round
recently introduced by [8] with these data.
A. Notations
In the following M,C,D,K and E denote respectively the
plaintext, the correct ciphertext, the faulty ciphertext, the secret
key and the error value (calculated by Xoring C and D).
Depending on the context they may refer to the whole AES
state (16 bytes) or to a given single byte (corresponding to
the fault location). The SubByte transformation of the AES is
denoted SB. The AES state at the beginning of the jth round
will be denoted by Mj − 1 (e.g. M9 denotes the state at the
start of the last round). Kj refers to the round key of the jth
round. For the sake of clarity the ShiftRows transformation is
left out in the following equations. A subscript index i may
be used to point to a given encryption among others. As there
is no MixColumns transformation during the AES last round
the cryptanalyses are performed bytewise.
B. Application of the Giraud’s DFA
Giraud [6] has introduced the first DFA against the AES last
round. It is based on a single-bit fault model, whose faults
have to target M9. The attack is performed bytewise: a byte
of K10 is retrieved with a success rate of 97% from three pairs
of correct and faulty ciphertexts (Ci, Di) by solving equations
1 and 2.
Ci = K10⊕ SB(M9i) (1)
Ci ⊕Di = SB(M9i)⊕ SB(M9i ⊕ E) (2)
With the experimental results presented in III-C, only three
byte of the AES state are compliant with the single-bit fault
model of Giraud’s DFA (bytes 1, 6, and 14 in tab. I). 13
bytes are close or beyond a single-bit occurrence rate of 80%.
Hence a higher number of (Ci, Di) pairs is needed to find the
corresponding key bytes. However, the attack is still feasible.
Yet two bytes have single-bit rates around 65% and byte #3
is below 50%. For bytes presenting these statistics, Giraud’s
DFA may not be the most efficient scheme.
C. Application of the Roche et al. DFA
The DFA recently introduced by Roche et al. [7] was
originally based on the injection of constant faults on the 9th
and 10th round keys. From the equations of a correct and
a faulty ciphertexts (Ci and Di respectively) equation 3 is
obtained:
SB(SB−1(Ci ⊕K10)⊕ E9)⊕K10⊕ E10 = Di (3)
where E9, E10, and K10 are unknown. The cryptanalysis
is conducted bytewise. The success rate in retrieving K10 is
higher than 90% with three pairs (Ci, Di).
This technique was also extended to none-constant faults:
as the fault repeatability is decreasing, the number of (Ci, Di)
pairs increases. Moreover, without any lack of generality,
this attack may be expanded to the fault model used in our
experiments (i.e. faults injected on M9) by nullifying E10 in
eq. 3.
The experimental data gathered in our experiments were
analysed according this DFA scheme. Given the fault re-
peatability (i.e. the most common fault rate of table I’s last
column) 9 bytes required 6 or less (Ci, Di) pairs to retrieve
the corresponding key bytes because their fault repeatability
was higher than 90%. Four bytes revealed a fault repeatability
around 50%: they required 15 (Ci, Di) pairs on average to
discover their round key bytes.
Likewise Giraud’s DFA, this scheme makes it possible
to retrieve the secret key. Despite this required more data
to succeed. However, the corresponding fault model is less
constraint than the single-bit requirement of Giraud’s DFA. It
may succeed where Giraud’s DFA will fail.
D. Simplification of an existing DFA
Lashermes et al. [8] have introduced a DFA scheme that
makes use of faults injected on M9 at the beginning of the AES
last round. Its originality compared with the DFA schemes of
Giraud and Roche et al. resides in the bytewise analysis of the
injected faults. From the equations of the correct ciphertext Ci
and the faulted ciphertext Di (equations 4 and 5 respectively):
Ci = K10⊕ SB(M9i) (4)
Di = K10⊕ SB(M9i ⊕ Ei) (5)
where Ei is the injected fault, the expression of Ei (eq. 6) is
obtained:
Ei = SB
−1(Ci ⊕K10)⊕ SB
−1(Di ⊕K10) (6)
In eq. 6 Ci and Di are known and Ei and K10 are unknown.
The DFA consists in building an error table (see table V):
its columns represent the 256 round key feasible values (i.e.
hypotheses k); for each line (called a realization of index i)
the corresponding values of the injected fault ei,k = Ei are
calculated from eq. 6, the (Ci,Di) pairs, and the key hypothesis
k.
TABLE V
ERROR TABLE
K10 hypothesis k
Realization i ’0x00’ ’0x01 ’0x02’ · · · ’0xFF’
0 e0,0 e0,1 e0,2 · · · e0,255
1 e1,0 e1,1 e1,2 · · · e1,255
2 e2,0 e2,1 e2,2 · · · e2,255
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Only one column of the error table corresponds to the
correct key byte K10. This column also gives the faults
that have been actually injected. [8] provides a complete
methodology based on the calculation of the entropy of the
errors to discriminate the right key byte (i.e. the right column).
Table VI reports the error table obtained from the fault
injection attempts on byte #3 (cf. tab. IV).
It is therefore easy to ascertain that the corresponding value
of the key byte is ’0xCD’. The faults values in every columns
appear random except for the key hypothesis ’0xCD’ where
TABLE VI
ERROR TABLE OF BYTE #3
K10 hypothesis k
Realization i ’0x00’ ’0x01’ · · · ’0xCD’ · · · ’0xFF’
0 ’0x63’ ’0x61’ · · · ’0x02’ · · · ’0x15’
1 ’0xB2’ ’0x0A’ · · · ’0x06’ · · · ’0x59’
2 ’0x0C’ ’0xBF’ · · · ’0x02’ · · · ’0x1E’
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
158 ’0x51’ ’0xFF’ · · · ’0x06’ · · · ’0x1A’
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
3,578 ’0xF2’ ’0x49’ · · · ’0x08’ · · · ’0x82’
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
10,000 ’0x09’ ’0x3B’ · · · ’0x0A’ · · · ’0x33’
the faults (outlined in bold) are restricted to the four least
significant bits (see Table IV). This result is consistent with the
design of our target IC: only four bits of byte #3 were affected
by the laser beam because its logic blocks are scrambled.
Only a few (Ci,Di) pairs may be sufficient to find K10’s
byte. Figure 5 excerpted from [8] gives the average number
of faults needed to succeed as a function of the faults entropy.
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Fig. 5. Average minimum number of faults needed to find the key for a
given injection entropy [8]
The fault injection process on byte #3 has an entropy of
1.3. Thus 3.5 faults on average are needed to successfully
retrieving the right key byte. Given the statistics of byte #3 (∼
50% repeatability and single-bit occurrence rate) this approach
appears more efficient than Giraud’s and Roche et al.’s DFA (15
realizations are needed for the latter). However, this statement
cannot be generalised. It holds when the injected fauls have a
distinctive pattern and a low repeatability.
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
We have described in this paper experiments of laser fault
injection through the front side of an IC implementing the
AES-128. Because of the reflective effect of its metal fills a
large laser beam (125 ∗ 125µm2) was used. Injection with
a laser beam of a few micrometers would have been time-
overconsuming.
We have observed two fault types: bit-flip and bit-set (or
bit-reset). The latter type was unexpected because it seemed
more consistent with the use of a smaller beam affecting only
one laser-sensitive area. The bit-flip type is explainable by the
simultaneous illumination of two sensitive areas corresponding
respectively to a bit-set and a bit-reset. These results are
obtained because the metal fills behave as shutters: at byte
level only one or very few sensitive areas are exposed to
the laser. Moreover a large part of the induced faults were
single-bit despite the size of the laser beam. This precision
was achieved thanks to the metal coverage. The analysis of
the injected faults had also corroborated the data-dependent
and time-dependent nature of laser injection.
These fault injection experiments were performed at the
beginning of the AES last round. The faults statistics allowed
to recover the secret key by using either Giraud’s DFA [6] or
Roche et al. DFA [7]. However, for faults with a low single-bit
occurrence rate and/or a low repeatability, these two schemes
of DFA are not the most efficient. We finally proposed a simple
application of the DFA scheme introduced by Lashermes et al.
[8] that makes it possible to recover the secret key in a more
efficient way.
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